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Abstract
This study examined the extent to which myside bias was observed in the context of
ethical decision making. In judgment and decision making research the resistance of
myside bias is described as a component of rational thinking. Thus, to some effect, this
study aimed to examine the extent to which people act rationally when making ethical
decisions. Measures of thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking and need
for cognition) as well as measures of cognitive reflection and probabilistic knowledge
were included in the study to examine their associations with myside bias in ethical
decisions. Modest myside bias effects were observed between and within-subjects,
however, for within-subjects bias the effect failed to reach statistical significance.
Exploration of the data beyond the study’s main research questions revealed significant
myside bias effects for participants categorized as utilitarian. Finally, actively openminded thinking was found to moderate myside bias effects.
Keywords: ethics, decision making, heuristics and biases, dual-process theory,
myside bias
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Myside Bias in Probabilistic Ethical Decision Making

There exists in most cultures a common sentiment that we humans are the only
true ‘rational beasts’ on this planet and that, on the whole, the accumulation of human
knowledge and the means by which we reason represent a pinnacle of mental complexity
and sophistication. While in many ways that common sentiment rings true, many people
are surprised to learn that we humans are not quite as rational as we tend to believe (see
Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2013). Even after three decades of research that outlines
the deficiencies of human reasoning as well as the proneness we share to exercise biased
thinking and form faulty heuristics, there still remains resistance to the notion that
humans are not inherently rational (Stanovich, 2011). Moreover, it has been found that
many of the systematic thinking bias and heuristics common among people are either not
associated, or associated only modestly, with cognitive ability, suggesting that even those
of high intelligence are prone to make use of such heuristics and biases (Stanovich, 2009,
2011; Stanovich & West, 2008b).
While the breadth of heuristic and biases research has grown substantially over
the last 30 years, the focus of the present study concerns myside bias. Broadly defined,
“myside bias occurs when people evaluate evidence, generate evidence, and test
hypotheses in a manner biased towards their own prior opinions and attitudes”
(Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013, p. 259). Put another way, the term “myside bias”
describes a process in which an individual skews the objectivity of evidence, arguments,
or conclusions in way that disproportionally places more strength and significance in
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those which favor their own personally held beliefs, opinions, or attitudes.
Beginning in 1990s, myside bias began to attract the focus of judgment and decision
making researchers. Baron (1995), for example, examined myside bias as it concerned
arguments about abortion. Baron found that participants rated arguments that favored
their stance on the issue of abortion as significantly better than arguments of equal
strength that conflicted with their stance. Baron also found that participants rated onesided arguments as significantly better than two-sided arguments. Finally, Baron’s
experiments pertaining to myside bias yielded results that suggested actively openminded thinking, a multifarious thinking disposition, may be negatively associated with
myside bias as well as the preference for one-sided arguments.
The work of Baron is only a sample of his extensive research of myside bias and
of the body of research of myside bias as a whole. Like the work of Baron, many
examinations of myside bias use the same measurement framework of comparing the
rating of written arguments of polarizing issues. There are, however, other ways in
which myside bias has been examined in the literature, which have demonstrated that
other factors such as group membership can induce myside bias. For example, an
instance of group membership induced myside bias occurs when one values products
built by their own country more when compared to equivalent products of another
country (Stanovich & West, 2008b).
Stanovich and West’s (2008b) “German Car Problem,” the most relevant
empirical study of myside bias to the present study, examined myside bias betweensubjects by showing participants one of two similar prompts:
Condition 1:
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According to a comprehensive study by the U.S. Department of Transportation, a
particular German car is 8 times more likely than a typical family car to kill
occupants of another car in a crash. The U.S. Department of Transportation is
considering recommending a ban on the sale of this German car.
Condition 2:
According to a comprehensive study by the U.S. Department of Transportation,
Ford Explorers are 8 times more likely than a typical family car to kill occupants
of another car in a crash. The Department of Transportation in Germany is
considering recommending a ban on the sale of the Ford Explorer in Germany.
In the first condition, participants were asked to rate the degree to which they thought the
German car should be banned from sale in United States on a 6-point scale (Definitely
Yes to Definitely No), as well as the degree to which they thought the German car should
be allowed on U.S. streets. Similarly for the second condition, participants were asked to
rate the degree to which they thought the Ford Explorer should be banned from sale in
Germany and the degree to which they thought the Ford Explorer should be allowed on
the streets of Germany.
Responses between the two conditions were found to be noticeably disparate from
one another. In the first condition, 78.4% of participants thought that, to whatever
degree, the German car should be banned from sale in the United States. Nearly 74% of
those same participants thought that, again to whatever degree, the German car should
not be allowed on U.S. streets. Conversely, in the second condition, responses were
51.4% and 39.2%, respectively, for the Ford Explorer. These differences statistically
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significant (Stanovich & West, 2008b; Stanovich et al, 2013).
As one can imagine, the presence and prevalence of myside bias can affect a host
of decisions not limited to those found in academic settings. Rather, particularly for
controversial issues, the presence of myside bias has the potential to distort one’s
objectivity when evaluating arguments or making decisions that carry with them
substantial implications (Baron, 1995; Stanovich & West, 2008a, Stanovich & West,
2008b). There is certainly an appreciable amount of research that examines myside bias
in multitude of contexts (for examples see Baron, 1995; Evans, 2002; Stanovich & West,
2007; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003).
Myside bias, like nearly all biases and heuristics in the judgment and decision
making literature, is often examined through the lens of dual-process theory (DPT). The
breadth of DPT is much too expansive to fully disseminate here and there is a large
amount of variance surrounding the particulars of the theory across researchers.
However, it is important to note that for the purposes of the present study, the defaultinterventionist perspective espoused by Evans and Stanovich (2013) is maintained.
Hence, any mention of DPT refers to the default-interventionist perspective, which is
expanded below.
According to dual-process theories in the context of judgment and decision
making research, the mind engages in two distinct types of cognitive processing: Type 1
processing and Type 2 processing. Type 1 processes are considered the default element of
the default-interventionist perspective. Type 1 processing has been characterized as fast,
intuitive, heuristic-based, unconscious, automatic, associative, and autonomous (Evans,
1984, 1989; Kahneman, 2011, Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2009, 2011; Wilson, 2002). As
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Stanovich writes (2011) the defining feature of Type 1 processing is its autonomy and the
implications that follow from having an autonomous processing system (see also Evans
& Stanovich, 2013). One such implication mentioned by Stanovich is that executing a
Type 1 process is mandatory upon encountering a triggering stimulus. In other words,
Type 1 processing describes the instantaneous and implicit associations individuals make
when encountering particular types of problems, contexts, situations, or more generally,
stimuli. As a result of its automaticity, Type 1 processing is also computationally
inexpensive and because of this, Type 1 processes may operate in parallel with one
another.
Opposite of Type 1 processing, Type 2 processing is characterized as slow,
analytic, rule-based, language-based, goal-oriented, conscious, and reflective (Evans,
1984, 1989; Kahneman, 2011, Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2009, 2011; Wilson, 2002).
The defining feature of Type 2 processing is that it is a controlled kind of processing
which intervenes on a default Type 1 response. Commonly used terms such as,
‘hypothetical thinking’, ‘abstract thinking’, ‘critical thinking’, and so on all fall under the
umbrella of Type 2 processing. This kind of processing, counter to Type 1 processing, is
serial and computationally expensive.
Much of the judgment and decision making literature concerning DPT illustrates
that the failure to engage in Type 2 processing and intervene on a Type 1 response is a
main source of thinking errors, many of which are the result of learned heuristics and
biases associated with Type 1 processing. Therefore, when empirical research
concerning DPT suggests that Type 1 processing is favored over Type 2 processing, it is
not that individuals necessarily lack the capacity or capability to engage in Type 2
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processing. Rather, it is more likely that individuals simply do not often engage in Type
2 processing in the first place and thus do not often intervene on Type 1 responses.
As a result, thinking dispositions such as the tendency to engage in cognitive
reflection, consider many alternative possibilities, and enjoy abstract or “deep” thinking
have all been found to be associated with higher utilization of Type 2 processing and in
many cases resistance to cognitive biases (Stanovich, 2009, 2011). Returning to myside
bias, it is thought by some that myside bias is best characterized as a Type 1 response as
it is unrelated to many measures associated with Type 2 processing (Stanovich & West,
2008b).
The present study examines myside bias in the context of ethical decision making.
Specifically, the present study seeks to examine whether myside bias effects are
demonstrated when participants are tasked with making probabilistic decisions in which a
strong ethical component is present. In the context of DPT, moral psychologists have
proposed that many ethical decisions operate within the same framework. For example,
Haidt’s (2009) social-intuitionist model postulates that moral decisions are often made
using intuitions (Type 1) rather than strategic reasoning (Type 2) and according to the
model, moral rationales (Type 2 responses) are made only after a default moral intuition
is evoked (Type 1 response). Thus, Haidt’s model conforms to the default-interventionist
perspective of DPT. Other findings within moral psychology reveal that absolute moral
judgments are more associated with Type 1 processing, while utilitarian moral judgments
are associated with Type 2 processing (Greene, 2007; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011).
While myside bias has been evaluated in a number of different ways, most often
through the use of argument evaluation tasks, it has seldom been examined in the context
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of ethical decision making. As such, the present study makes use of a novel approach to
investigating myside bias. Specifically, the present study asks participants to make lifesaving decisions by allocating organs among two groups of patients, while each group of
patients has associated with it a different chance of survival than the other group. Of the
four ethical decision making items that use this format in the present study, one contains
a myside bias element. More information regarding these items is provided in the
Methods section.
Organ Allocation as an Ethical Decision Making Task
The intended means of evaluating myside bias in probabilistic ethical decision
making is the result of combining a number of different item structures and ideas from
numerous sources. That is, the conception of my approach is influenced by several prior
studies. First among those influences is the work of Ubel and Loewenstein (1995, 1996).
Ubel and Loewenstein’s research at the time concerned gaining insight into the public’s
preference for organ allocation. Specifically, Ubel and Loewenstein were interested in
evaluating whether the public’s preference for organ allocation was commensurate with
the national policy, which at the time was to prioritize organ allocation to those in the
most critical conditions, rather than necessarily those with the best chance of surviving if
given an organ. To do so, Ubel and Loewenstein (1996) created the following item:
We are going to ask you about a health issue. There are no “right” or “wrong”
answers to these questions. As you may know, there is a shortage of livers
available for those who need transplants. This problem is especially bad for
children. Suppose that 200 children are waiting to receive a liver transplant, none
of whom have any other health problems. They need to receive these transplants
within one year or they will die. In that time, only 100 usable livers will become
available. Children who do not receive a transplant will die.
A blood test is available that divides the children into two groups, each with a
different chance of surviving transplant. No other information predicts their
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outcomes as reliably as this blood test.
Group 1 (100 patients): 80% chance of surviving if transplanted
Group 2 (100 patients): 50% chance of surviving if transplanted
What percentage of the 100 livers do you think should go to each group?
Group 1: _____%
Group 2: _____ %
Total:

100%

The intention of Ubel and Loewenstein (1996) was not to examine ethical
decision making, per se, but rather to examine whether people’s preference to allocate
organs in a utilitarian way (i.e., allocate to those with the highest chance of surviving if
given the organ, which saves the maximum number of lives, as opposed to giving the
organs to those in the most critical conditions). However, their item appears to put
participants within an ethical context by resting the responsibility of liver allocation on
them. Because there are too few livers to allocate to everyone, the participants must
consider their own moral standing, as well as consult the probabilistic evidence (i.e., the
transplant survival rates) to come to a final allocation decision.
In the present study, the item from Ubel and Loewenstein (1996) will be modified
to use the German Car Problem’s myside manipulation as a model, such that group
identities will become the United States and Germany. Thus, in this attempt, the Ubel
and Loewenstein item will be modified to reflect prior research of myside bias in which
the two group identities elicited a noticeable myside bias effect. However, unlike the
German Car Problem no directly salient name (e.g., the Ford Explorer) is used, though
using the United States and Germany as group identities provides more myside salience
to the participants than do the Group 1 and Group 2 identities used by Ubel and
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Loewenstein, as is reflected in the “German Car Problem” (see Appendices A and B).
The present study contains three purposes for evaluating myside bias in the
context of ethical reasoning. The first and broadest purpose is to examine myside bias as
it manifests in an ethical decision making task. The second purpose of the present study
is to examine the associations between organ allocation tendencies in the ethical decision
making task and several measures commonly used in the judgment and decision making
literature. The judgment and decision making measures include a measure of cognitive
reflections, measures of thinking dispositions associated with Type 2 processing, and a
measure of probabilistic knowledge. The final purpose of the present study is to explore
further aspects of organ allocation tendencies using supplemental measures included in
the study. Towards this purpose, no formal hypotheses are given. Rather, the findings
obtained using the supplemental measures are intended to inform future research and
generate hypotheses for future research. The supplemental measures include measures of
probability matching, the tendency to rely on base rates in predictive decision tasks, and
ethical dilemmas, which were used to assess the ethical standing of participants as either
absolutist or utilitarian, and other potentially informative tasks.
Derived from the study’s first purpose are two research questions. The first
research question asks to what extent a between-subjects myside bias effect is observed.
It was hypothesized that a between-subjects myside bias effect would be observed and
that this effect will favor organ allocation towards the United States group. A second
research question asks to what extent a within-subjects myside bias effect is observed.
That is, it is asked whether individual allocation tendencies change when allocating for
groups without a myside element (i.e., Country A and Country B) when compared to their
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allocation tendencies for groups with a myside element (i.e., Germany and United
States) in a way that favors the United States groups. Towards this research question it
was hypothesized that a within-subjects myside effect that favors the United States group
would be observed.
A third and final research question was derived from the second purpose of the
present study. This research question asks in what ways are organ allocation tendencies
towards high survival groups associated with two thinking disposition measures, the
Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and a new version
of the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale (Stanovich & West, under contract), as
well as two cognitive measures, the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) and a
Numeracy Scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) Further, the third research question ask
how the four measures might in isolation or conjunction moderate any observed myside
bias effects. It was hypothesized that all four measures would be positively associated
with the allocation of more organs to the high survival groups in each organ allocation
task. Further, it was hypothesized that one or some combination of these measures would
moderate myside bias effects.
Methods
Participants
A sample of 300 participants (175 men, 125 women, Mage = 33.87, SD = 9.99, age
range: 18-71 years) was collected using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) online
service.1 Participants were compensated four dollars for roughly twenty minutes of their
time (Mtime = 22.87 minutes). In order to facilitate the myside bias manipulation, only
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participants from the United States were allowed to participate. A majority of the sample
had received some degree of college education, as 36.8% had completed ‘some college’,
40.1% had obtained a bachelor’s degree, and 8.6% had obtain a graduate level degree. Of
the remaining participants, 13.2% had complete high school or earned their GED.
Materials
A myriad of different tasks were used in the present study. Among them are
measures of organ allocation, thinking dispositions, cognitive reflection, and numeracy.
Further, two follow up questions to the allocation tasks, a measure of probability
matching, and two ethical dilemmas are included for exploratory purposes. Each of these
measurement instruments (sans the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale) are included
in the Appendices.
Materials Related to the Research Questions
Measures of allocation (MoA) – Myside: Livers. Drawing from past research
involving allocation decisions (Ubel & Loewenstein, 1995, 1996), an item was modified
to include a myside bias element used in prior myside bias research (Stanovich & West,
2008b). Specifically, the myside bias element is the salience of the group identities as
being the United States and Germany. For this particular item, participants were asked to
distribute 100 livers between two groups of 100 children each, 100 children in the United
States and 100 children in Germany. Participants were told that without these livers for
transplant, all of the children will die. However, each group had attached to it a different
probability of survival for transplant procedures. In condition 1, participants were given
a version of the problem in which the United States has attached to it an 80% chance of
transplant survival while Germany had attached to it a 50% chance of transplant survival.
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In condition 2, the survival rates were reversed between the two groups (i.e., US 50% ;
GER 80%). Participants were given the question prompt and asked to enter the raw
number of livers they choose to allocate to each group into two text fields, one for the
United States and one for Germany, which together were required to total 100.
Measures of allocation – Non-myside: Kidneys, heart valves, and surgical
procedures. Beyond the myside MoA, three other MoAs given to the participants. Those
other three MoAs did not incorporate a myside bias element, such that the group
identities were not myside salient to the participants (e.g., Town A and Town B). Further,
the amount of children in need of transplants (as well as group sizes) and the probability
of survival for each of the groups also varied. The first non-myside MoA is intended to
be directly compared to the myside MoA. Thus, the total number of children (200) and
the group sizes (100 each) are identical in the two problems. The probability of surviving
the transplant for the groups are also identical (e.g., 80% and 50%). For the first nonmyside MoA, however, the organs being allocated are kidneys as opposed to livers. Note
that because the groups are not myside salient in the non-myside MoAs, there is no need
for two conditions of the items. Therefore, each condition from the myside MoA sees the
same non-myside MoAs. The second non-myside MoA asked participants to allocate
artificial heart valves among a total of 800 children (400 in each group) at survival rates
of 40% and 25%. Finally, the third non-myside MoA asked participants to allocate
surgical procedures (instead of organs) among 200 total children (100 in each group) at
survival rates of 70% and 30%. The final non-myside MoA intends to induce probability
matching, wherein participants who probability match think that giving 70 surgical
procedures to the 70% survival rate group and 30 surgical procedures to the 30% survival
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group saves the most lives. Responses for these items were recorded in the same manner
as the myside MoA described above.2
Cognitive Reflection Test. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to
measure the tendency to override an intuitive response alternative that is incorrect and
instead engage in further reflection that leads to a correct response. It consists of three
items such that the correct response to each item requires at least some reflection on
behalf of a participant. Participants responded to the items by providing their answer in a
blank text field. Scores for participants range from 1-3, the totaled sum of correct
responses. An example item from the CRT is, “If a bat and a ball together cost $1.10 and
the bat costs $1 more than the ball, how much does the ball cost?”
Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale. An updated version of the Actively
Open-minded Thinking (AOT) Scale was used (Stanovich & West, under contract) in the
present study. The AOT Scale is composed for 30 items that tap flexible thinking,
openness, dogmatism, categorical thinking, and counterfactual thinking. Responses for
the scale were recorded on a 6-point scale: Strongly Agree (6), Moderately Agree (5),
Slightly Agree (4), Slightly Disagree (3), Moderately Disagree (2), and Strongly Disagree
(1). Total scores were generated by taking the sum of each of the 30 items, whereby
higher scores reflect higher measures of actively open-minded thinking. Some example
items include, “People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against
their beliefs,” and, “Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon, no matter how good
a case can be made against them” (reverse scored).
Need for Cognition Scale. The Need for Cognition (NFC) Scale measures "the
tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking" (Cacioppo et al, 1996).
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Cacioppo et al surveyed 2797 participants over 11 studies and found that alpha
coefficients for the scale ranged from .81 to .97. The NFC Scale consists of 18 items and
the responses were reported on a 6-point scale: Strongly Agree (6), Moderately Agree (5),
Slightly Agree (4), Slightly Disagree (3), Moderately Disagree (2), and Strongly Disagree
(1). Total scores were generated by taking the sum of the 18 items, whereby higher
scores reflect higher measures of need for cognition. Some example items include,
“Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much” (reverse scored), and, “The
notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.”
Numeracy Scale. An 11-item numeracy scale was used to assess participants’
prior knowledge of probability. The numeracy scale to be used in this study is the
amalgam of two numeracy measures used by Lipkus et al (2001). Lipkus et al found in
initial studies using the scale an alpha coefficient if .78. Responses to these items are
provided in either a multiple choice or free response format. Items were scored as either
correct or incorrect and a summed total score was calculated. Some example items are,
“If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the
disease out of 1000?” and, “The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of
10,000 people, about how many of them are expected to get infected?”
Materials for Exploratory Purposes
Measure of probability matching – The marble task. An item was written for this
study that intends to assess participants’ susceptibility to engage in probability matching
when evaluating a problem involving the use of probabilistic thinking. The item asked
participants to suppose they are playing a game in which they draw marbles from a bowl
and will be rewarded a hypothetical $5 for each correct guess. The participants were told
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that there were nine marbles in the bowl, three black and six white. They then were told
that in this game marbles were replaced (i.e., after you draw a marble, it is put back into
the bowl) and that they were to go through nine rounds of guessing which color marble
they would draw. This item is not scored in a typical way (e.g., correct or incorrect,
Likert scale, etc.) but instead flags those who probability matched. Thus, if participants
guessed three black marbles and six white marbles over the nine rounds, then they were
labeled as probability matchers for this item. Participants who guess all white marbles
are considered “maximizers.”
Measure of allocation follow up questions. Following the final non-myside MoA
were two questions. First, participants were asked if they believe that their allocation
strategy saved the most lives possible. For this question, responses were recorded on a 4point scale with the option of Definitely Yes (4), Probably Yes (3), Probably No (2), and
Definitely No (1). Second, the participants were asked if they would prefer to ignore the
given survival rates and instead have the surgical procedures randomly distributed
between the two groups. Responses for the second follow up question were recorded on
a simple 2-point scale of options Yes and No.
Ethical dilemmas – The Trolley Car Problem. A modified version of the
“Trolley Car Problem” was used (Greene, Morellia, Lowenberg, Nystorm, & Cohen,
2008). Participants were presented with two dilemmas in which they must decide whether
or not to intervene in a situation in which a runaway trolley is going to kill five people.
In the first problem, participants were given the option of pulling a lever that redirects the
trolley onto a different set of tracks. However, in doing so, one person caught on those
tracks would be killed. In the second problem, participants had to decide whether to push
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a fat man off of a footbridge and onto the tracks in front of the runaway trolley. If the
participants refused, five people further down the tracks would die. If the participants
pushed the man onto the tracks, his size would be enough to stop the trolley and save the
five people, but he would die. Though the context for each problem is markedly
different, in either case the participants had to choose to saving the lives of five people or
saving the life of one person. These ethical dilemmas were used by the researchers to
give some indication of the participants’ moral stance given the conditions (i.e., absolutist
or utilitarian).
Procedure
United States users of Amazon’s Mturk selected themselves into participation of
the present study by selecting the study’s posting among other Mturk offers presented to
them. After selecting the present study, participants were redirected to a Qualtrics survey
containing the materials listed above. Participants were first shown informed consent
documents in which they needed to electronically acknowledge prior to beginning the
survey. Upon receiving consent, participants were then shown the myside MoA, in which
they were randomly selected into conditions (153 in condition 1 and 147 in condition 2).
Following the (1) myside MoA, all participants completed the survey in the following
order: (2) the CRT, (3) the NFC scale, (4) the Marble Task, (5) the AOT scale, (6)
demographic information, (7) the non-myside MoAs (kidney, heart valves, and surgical
procedures), (6) the MoA follow up questions, (9) the Numeracy Scale, and (10) the
ethical dilemmas.
The tasks in the survey were ordered strategically in hopes that their placement
would reduce the potential for priming effects. In particular, measures that were
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suspected of priming Type 2 processing were distanced from the non-myside MoAs. It
has been found in one study, for example, that the CRT acts as a successful prime of
utilitarian moral reasoning (Paxton et al, 2011). That is, the CRT has been found to
prime reflective thinking (i.e., Type 2 processing), which is more associated with
utilitarian moral decisions than intuitive Type 1 responses, which are more associated
with absolute moral decisions. More generally, tasks that require calculation or
deliberation, such as the Numeracy Scale, prime Type 2 processing. The NFC scale,
consisting of affective items rather than cognitive items like the CRT or the Numeracy
Scale, was also a concern for priming. While no research has been found to support the
notion that the NFC scale may prime Type 2 processing, it was the judgment of the
researcher that it may have been problematic, as asking participants whether they are
deep thinkers may lead some to have been self-conscious and perhaps to think more
deeply about problems that followed the NFC scale. The ethical dilemmas were also
suspected of eliciting a priming effect by potentially causing participants to think more
deeply about their moral standing. For all of these reasons, the presentation of the tasks
used in the present study was not counterbalanced. Instead, tasks were placed
strategically to allow for a maximum amount of space between the myside and nonmyside MoAs, as well as to prevent potential priming tasks from appearing before the
non-myside MoAs.
Categorization of Participants
To explore the data for trends that might influence future research, participants
were categorized into several ways. First, participants were categorized dependent upon
how they responded to the MoAs. Three categories were created. Participants were

MYSIDE BIAS IN ETHICAL DECISION MAKING

18

considered “maximizers” if they allocated all of the organs to the groups with the highest
survival rates. Participants were categorized as “equal chancers” if they split the organs
50/50 among the two groups in the MoAs. Finally, participants were put into an “other”
category if they used allocation strategies other than those mentioned. Only participants
who were consistently maximizers, equal chancers, or others across all of the MoAs were
categorized, resulting in a subset of 202 of the 300 participants (42 maximizers, 60 equal
chancers, and 100 other).
Participants were also categorized as either utilitarian or absolutist dependent
upon their responses to the ethical dilemmas. Utilitarians are those participants who
chose to save five lives over one life in the ethical dilemmas. Absolutists are those that
chose to save only one life in the ethical dilemmas. These labels are admittedly crude.
The term absolutist refers to one who is likely think ethically in terms of absolute moral
truths. Therefore, in the ethical dilemmas, the act of pulling the switch or pushing the
large man off of the footbridge would be considered murder, which to absolutists is
absolutely unethical in any instance. The term utilitarian refers to one who believes that
saving the maximum number of lives in the ethical choice, regardless of the means used
to do so. Under the utilitarian view, then, pulling the switch and pushing the large man
off of the footbridge are necessary actions to save the most lives and are therefore ethical.
While it is impossible to completely infer the degree to which a given participant
is either absolutist or utilitarian using the ethical dilemmas, the categorization used in the
present study was conservative, as only participants that responded in the same way to
both dilemmas (n = 206, 90 absolutists, 116 utilitarians) were categorized. Thus, the
judgment of the researcher is that using this categorization provides a useful distinction
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for examining differences between the two ethical positions. Furthermore, the MoAs
bare some semblance to the ethical dilemmas, as the participants’ decisions could be
based on saving the most lives (maximizers) or based on maintaining a position of
absolute fairness by giving children of both groups equal chances of receiving and organ
(equal chancers).
Results
Between-subjects Myside Bias
Towards the first research question, an independent samples t-test was conducted
to assess the difference between the average number of organs allocated to the US80%
group (M = 69.29, SD = 19.27) in condition 1 and the GER80% group (M = 71.58, SD =
20.25) in condition 2. The results of the one-tailed t-test showed a significant difference
between the two conditions, ts(298) = -1.714, p = .044, d = -.198, r = .099, 95% CI [-∞, .157]. Following the test for between-subjects myside bias, analyses were conducted to
assess the second research question that asked to what extent a within-subjects myside
bias in favor of the United States would be observed.
Within-subjects Myside Bias
A two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess the
second research question. For the analysis, the 80% groups from both conditions (US80%
and GER80%) were compared to the 80% group in the comparison non-myside MoA.
Because the myside MoA and comparison non-myside MoA items were identical except
for the group identities, these two items were collapsed into a within-subjects variable in
which the myside MoA was thought of as time 1 and the comparison non-myside MoA
was thought of as time 2.
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Results of the mixed ANOVA are displayed in Table 1 and Figure 1. Though the
interaction between time (i.e. myside versus non-myside) and condition (i.e. U.S. 80%
versus Germany 80%) failed to be statistically significant F(1, 298) = 2.826, p = .094, ηp2
= .009, it was deemed worthy of subsequent investigation. A follow-up t-test supported
the between-subjects myside bias effect in allocation rates for the myside MoA, ts(298) =
-1.714, p = .044, d = -.198, r = .099, 95% CI [-∞, -.157]. Individuals assigned to the
United States favored and German favored condition reported similar allocation rates for
the comparison non-myside MoA, ts(298) = -.357, p = .721, d = -.041, r = .021, 95% CI
[-5.428, 3.761]. Individuals assigned to the German favored condition allocated more
organs to the non-myside MoA (M = 70.75, SD = 20.18) than the myside MoA (M =
65.07, SD = 23.320), ts(146) = -3.567, p < .001, d = .59, r = .283, 95% CI [-8.828, 2.533]. Allocation rates failed to change across the myside MoA (M = 69.29, SD =
19.27) and non-myside MoA (M = 71.58, SD = 20.25) for the United States favored
condition, ts(152) = -1.825, p = .07, d = -.148, r = .074, 95% CI [-4.764, .189].
The Relationships of CRT, AOT, NFC, and Numeracy on Organ Allocation
The third research question asked to what extent CRT, AOT, NFC, and Numeracy
are associated with allocating organs to the high survival groups in the MoAs and to what
extent might these variables or a combination of these variables moderate any observed
myside bias effects. Bivariate correlations were obtained to examine these relationships
(see Table 2). Nearly all correlations between the scales and MoAs were positive with the
exception of the relationship between NFC and one of the non-myside MoAs (r = -.021, p
= .716). Furthermore, none of the associations between NFC and any of the MoAs were
significant.
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The associations among the CRT, AOT, and Numeracy and the MoAs were all
found to be statistically significant with two exceptions – CRT and AOT both failed to
significantly correlate with the same non-myside MoA concerning the allocation of heart
valves to groups with 40% and 25% survival rates (r = .092, p = .112 and r = .112, p =
.053, respectively). The heart valves MoA was the only MoA not to use survival rates of
80% and 50%. Examination of the distributions of CRT and Numeracy scores revealed
noticeable ceiling effects, with the majority of participants scoring the highest possible
scores on these measures. Numeracy in particular displayed limited variability (M =
9.46, SD = 1.83, range: 1-11).
After observing the bivariate correlations and the distributions of the judgment
and decision making variables, it was determined that AOT was the only variable that
could viably moderate myside bias. This is because participants did not vary much on
CRT or Numeracy and NFC was not associated strongly with the MoAs, but was strongly
associated with AOT. Any moderation on the part of NFC, then, would potentially be
spurious and reflect the moderating influence of AOT.
To test the moderating influence of AOT on the between-subjects myside bias
effect, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted that entered AOT, the betweensubjects grouping variable from the myside MoA, and their interaction in three separate
and sequential steps (see Table 3). The model with all three terms was found to be
significant, F(3, 296) = 10.707, p < .001, R2 = .098, with a significantly higher amount of
variance explained by the interaction term, ΔF = 10.117, p = .002, ΔR2 = .031. The
interaction can be viewed graphically in Figure 2.
A similar hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the
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moderating influence of AOT on the within-subjects myside bias effect by using the
difference scores of the MoAs as a dependent variable (see Table 3). The difference
scores were calculated by subtracting the number of organs allocated to the 80% groups
on the myside MoA from the number of organs allocated to the 80% group of the
comparison non-myside MoA. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis showed
that the model containing AOT, the between-subjects grouping variable, and the
interaction was significant, F(3, 296) = 4.387, p = .005, R2 = .043, with a significantly
higher amount of variance explained by the interaction term, ΔF = 8.444, p = .004, ΔR2 =
.027. The interaction can be viewed graphically in Figure 3 and the points of intersection
and regions of significance for both the between and within-subjects interactions can be
viewed in Table 4.
Results of Exploratory Analyses
A number of other analyses were conducted to explore the data for findings that
could generate future research questions and hypotheses. These analyses made use of the
measures in the survey described as supplemental above. Further, various categorizations
were made (see the Methods section for explanations) and used in the exploratory
analyses.
First, a number of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to assess whether there
were significant differences among various categories of participants for CRT, AOT,
NFC, and Numeracy. There are reasons to suspect some categories of participants might
differ from others on these measures. For example, those who can be called utilitarians
and absolutists, as identified by the ethical dilemmas, might differ on measures such as
CRT, as the engagement of cognitive reflection has been linked to utilitarian moral
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judgments (Paxton et al, 2011).
A set of one-way ANOVAs were conducted that used a grouping variable derived
from the participants’ allocation tendencies. The ANOVAs compared maximizers, equal
chancers, and those who used an alternate strategy (n = 202, 42 maximizers, 60 equal
chancers, 100 “others”) on their average scores on the judgment and decision making
measures (see the Methods section). It was found that only the AOT and NFC variables
resisted violations of normality and homogeneity of variances and among those two
variables, only the ANOVA on AOT revealed significant differences among the three
groups, F(2, 201) = 10.998, p < .001, ηp2 = .099. Tukey pairwise comparisons for the
ANOVA showed that for AOT, maximizers had significantly higher scores than the equal
chancers and the other group, but the equal chancers and the other group did not
statistically differ from each other.
A set of independent samples t-tests were also conducted that compared the
means of the judgment and decision making variables between participants categorized as
utilitarians and absolutists (n = 206, 116 utilitarians, 90 absolutists). No significant
differences among AOT, CRT, NFC, and Numeracy were found. Following the t-tests,
absolutists and utilitarians were separately analyzed to assess each subsets extent of
observed myside biases.
Mixed-ANOVAs identical to the one conducted for the second research question
were conducted separately for absolutists and utilitarians. For absolutists, no significant
interaction or main effects were observed. For the utilitarians, however, a significant
interaction was observed, F(1, 116) = 9.422, p = .003, ηp2 = .076 (see Figure 4). This
interaction suggests that utilitarians exhibited a within-subjects myside bias in favor of
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the United States and the size of the effect was greater than the interactions found in the
complete sample. Moreover, mean allocations made by utilitarians were higher than
allocations made by absolutists (see Table 5), significantly so for the comparison nonmyside MoA, ts(204) = -4.195, p < .001, d = .58, r = .28, 95% CI [-16.320, -5.885].
As with the analysis of the second research question, follow up tests for the
interaction were conducted. Similar patterns as found for research question two were
obtained, as the same pairs of cell means were found to be significant in the follow up
tests. The t-test comparing the mean allocations to the 80% groups in the myside MoA
revealed a significant difference between the two myside conditions, ts(114) = -2.347, p
= .021, d = -.44, r = .21, demonstrating a significant between-subjects myside bias effect.
A t-test comparing the myside and non-myside MoAs for the Germany favored condition
also yielded significant results, ts(56) = -4.005, p < .001, d = -.57, r = .27.
As with the full sample, the moderating influence of AOT on the myside biases
was investigated using the same procedures. The hierarchical regression model
examining the influence of AOT in the between-subjects myside bias was found to be
highly significant, F(3, 112) = 11.59, p < .001, R2 = .216, with a significantly higher
amount of variance explained by the interaction term, ΔF = 12.176, p = .001, ΔR2 = .083,
that in the models without it (see Table 6 and Figure 5). When performing the same
analysis on the difference scores to examine the moderating influence of AOT on the
within-subjects myside bias, the model containing the interaction was also highly
significant, F(3, 112) = 8.12, p < .001, R2 = .179, with the interaction term explaining a
significant amount of variance over and above the other models, ΔF = 12.905, p = .001,
ΔR2 = .095 (see Table 6 and Figure 6). The points of intersection and regions of
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significance for the moderation analyses can be viewed in Table 7.
Discussion
The present study consisted of three goals. The first goal was to examine the
extent to which myside bias effects were observed both between and within subjects. It
was hypothesized that both kinds of bias would be observed in a manner that favored the
United States. Analysis of the data showed that a statistically significant betweensubjects myside bias effect was observed while a nonsignificant within-subjects myside
bias was observed. In either case, however, the meaningfulness of the effects is difficult
to interpret. The between-subjects myside effect, for example, was found to have rather
small effect sizes even though the t-test used to test for the between-subjects bias was
statistically significant. In total for the between-subjects myside effect, only about 1% of
the overall variance in organ allocation to the 80% group of the myside MoA can be
explained by the condition of the myside MoA participants were assigned to (r2 = .0098).
Conversely for the within-subject myside bias, statistical significance was not
obtained but the follow up tests of the nonsignificant interaction revealed interesting
behaviors between the two myside conditions. Specifically, it appeared that condition 2
(Germany favored) exhibited a within-subjects myside bias in favor of the United States.
Moreover, it is not clear whether condition 1 (United Stated favored) exhibited a withinsubjects myside. When the United States is favored in condition 1 allocation strategies do
not necessarily need to be adjusted to compensate for United States children with low
survival rates. That is, probabilistically it makes just as much sense to allocate organs to
the US80% group in the myside MoA as it does to allocate to the 80% group of the nonmyside MoA. It is therefore hard to parse out whether condition 1 allocated more organs
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because of a myside bias or if allocations in that condition were different as a result of the
favored survival rate. For the both the between and within subjects myside bias analyses,
it is apparent that some degree of myside bias was observed. Nevertheless, the ambiguity
surrounding these effects make coming to conclusions about the study’s corresponding
hypotheses difficult.
A second goal of the study was to examine the relationships between a set of
judgment and decision making variable and allocations to the high survival groups in the
MoAs, as well as determine if any of the judgment and decision making variables
moderated any observed myside bias effects. While positive associations were generally
found between CRT, AOT, NFC, Numeracy and the allocation of organs to the high
survival groups, the magnitude of the correlations were modest, typically between r = .1
and r = .2. In some cases, the correlations were confounded by low variability and
ceiling effects, specifically for the CRT and Numeracy variables. The issues of ceiling
effects and low variability in those variables undermined their amenability towards being
used in inferential statistics, as violations of statistical assumptions arose in all attempts
to do so.
Regarding moderation, it was determined that AOT was the only viable measure
whose moderating influence could be investigated. Interestingly, it was found that AOT
moderated both the between and within subjects myside bias effects. Points of
intersection and regions of significance were obtained for the two effects and it was
found that at thresholds of 130 and 128.39 on AOT for the between and within subjects
effects, significant differences in organ allocation dissipated between the two myside
conditions. For both effects, organs allocation was found to be no different when AOT
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score were around 143.
The moderating influence of AOT on myside bias is a particularly intriguing
finding of the present study. Results of the one of the exploratory analyses revealed that
AOT significantly differed for a subset of categorized participants. In particular, it was
found that maximizers scored significantly higher on AOT than did equal chancers or
other organ allocation strategies. It could be the case, then, the moderating influence of
AOT reflects this difference and that those who are lower on AOT tend to be equal
chancers or use other strategies. Furthermore, significant negative correlations between
observed myside bias and AOT have been found in other research (Stanovich & West,
2008a), the findings of which align with the between and within subjects myside biases
found in condition 2 (Germany favored). Given these results the third hypotheses can be
thought of as partially corroborated.
A third and final goal of the present study was to explore the data for findings that
might inform future research. In doing so, other measures not directly relevant to the
research questions were analyzed. One particularly notable finding emerged from the
exploratory analyses, which concerned the differences between participants categorized
as absolutist and those categorized as utilitarian. It was found that absolutists to nearly
no extent committed any kind of myside bias while utilitarians to large extent exhibited
both between and within subject myside biases. On its surface this finding seems to be
counterintuitive, as utilitarianism is often thought to be related to rational thinking, as it
involves calculation and is more associated with Type 2 processing (see Paxton et al,
2001). In retrospect, however, it makes sense that absolutists would be firm and
consistent in their allocations because they are likely adhering to an absolute ethical
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value, which by its definition does not change. The notion that utilitarians where to a
large extent biased, however, remains puzzling.
Unlike the findings of the entire sample, the subset of utilitarians exhibited
between and within subjects myside bias effects that were highly statistically significant
in both cases. The effect sizes for the analyses of utilitarians were also much larger than
those obtained using the full sample. A couple of potential conclusions can be drawn
from these findings. First, it is likely the case that the utilitarians, which make up over a
third of the overall sample, are the driving force if the biases observed in the overall
sample. Second, it could be the case that while some participants may be utilitarian in
spirit, they fail at being utilitarian in practice, that is, they lack the proper knowledge of
how to act in a utilitarian way. Observing a cross tabulation of the ethical dilemma and
marble task categorizations shows that less than half of the utilitarians properly
maximized in the marble task and over 27% (32 of 166) probability matched.
Interestingly, as reported above, utilitarians and absolutists did not significantly differ on
a measure of Numeracy. Thus, it is possible that even with an assumed knowledge of
how to maximize, utilitarians still did not do so. It is also possible that tasks like the
MoAs and the marble task that use two probabilities in a question create and environment
in which probability matching is more readily applied, whereas the Numeracy Scale does
not provide that same context.
Moderation analyses on the subset of the utilitarians also showed the amplified
effect of AOT on the observed myside biased. The points of intersection were found to
be higher than in the full sample. The regions of significance were also higher for the
utilitarian subset, suggesting that even at higher levels of AOT, myside bias effects start
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to emerge for utilitarians compared to the full sample.
Limitations
Throughout the research project, a number of limitations have become apparent
and though the goals of the present study were all to some degree met, it is important to
be cautious when interpreting the findings of the study. One of the study’s limitations
concerns the information provided by the MoAs. Largely, the distributions of responses
for the MoA were bimodal as the two most common responses were to either split the
organs 50/50 or allocate all of the organs to the high survival group (maximize).
Therefore, while the MoAs were conceived to be continuous variable, their distributions
indicate the items acted somewhat like categorical variables. There was still a feasible
amount of variability in the MoA as the skewness and kurtosis values indicated no
violations of normality. However, the large concentration of responses around several
specific allocation strategies suggests some analyses cannot be interpreted as liberally as
they can under regular circumstances. In particular, interpretation the moderation
analyses must acknowledge that the prediction lines that indicate the interactions are not
as accurate as they would be in analyses with more normally distributed dependent
variables. The need to qualify these interpretations is also reflected in the regression
models for the moderation analyses. Although the models presented were significant, the
variance explained in the regression models tended to be low.
There was another limitation discovered concerning the MoAs, specifically the
myside MoA. At the time of the myside MoA’s creation it was not known by the
researcher that livers are unlike other organs used in transplant situations. Transplant
patients needing livers, in fact, do not always require an entire liver to survive and
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recover from a liver transplant. There are many documented cases in which people
donated half of their livers to someone in need with both the donors and recipients
surviving and recovering. The extent to which this fact was known in the sample is
unknown. Theoretically, it is plausible that a participant allocating organs 50/50 assumed
the organs could be halved and thus, all children in each group would have a chance at
survival. Such a strategy has the potential to save more lives than does a maximizing
strategy.
Another limitation regards the categorizing of participants (e.g.,
utilitarian/absolutist and so on). Although participants were categorized conservatively
based on their consistency, there is still not a high degree of clarity as to whether the
categorization strongly represent that categories they refer to. For example, the
categorization of utilitarians and absolutists might not accurately reflect the extent to
which individuals are either utilitarian or absolutist. Furthermore, the ethical dilemmas
used to categorize participants are not typically used for that purpose, at least not in
isolation. These same concerns are echoed in the maximizer/equal chancer/other
categorization, as well as the categorizations made by the marble task. When those two
categorical variables were cross tabulated, it was found that some participants who
maximized on the MoAs were flagged as probability matchers in the marble task. It is
possible that the situation or context in which participants are placed in plays a role in
whether they maximize or probability match.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the novelty of this instance of myside bias
research. Because the present study examines myside bias in a novel way, there exists no
context in which the size of the effects can be compared, as there is among myside bias
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research that use similar argument tasks. Taken together, all of these limitations suggest
that while exciting effects were found, the interpretation of those effects must be made
cautiously. Ultimately, it is the judgment of the researcher that some degree of myside
bias effects were observed in an ethical decision making context, but the specificity of
those effects are uncertain.
Future Direction of Myside Bias Research in Ethical Decision Making
There are a number of ways in which the present study is influential for future
research of myside bias in ethical contexts. For example, modifications to the MoAs
could be made and compared. One way in which the MoAs could be altered is by using
countries other than Germany. Germany was originally chosen because of the countries
relative compatibility with the United States. Both countries have democratic
governments, capitalist economies, are technological leaders, and so on. The decision to
use a compatible countries was rooted in avoiding potential cofounds that participants
might have experience when comparing the two countries in the MoAs. However, it
would be interesting to compare the magnitude of myside bias effects as they apply to
different nation comparisons. For instance, one might expect a larger magnitude of
between-subjects bias is the United States and a communist country were paired in a
myside MoA.
Another alternative for future research could be to revise the items used in the
present study. The effects observed in this study suggest that some degree of myside bias
is present in the context of ethical decision making and there are perhaps better ways of
measuring myside bias in this context than by using the MoAs. The same is true for the
categorization variables, particular the utilitarian/absolutist distinction. Instead of
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dichotomizing subjects as either utilitarian or absolutists, it would be prudent for future
research to find continuous measures of utilitarianism and absolutist. If such continuous
measures could be found or created, then those measures could be used to make more
accurate predictions and distinctions. For example, one could examine how the extent to
which a person is utilitarian moderated organ allocation or the results of some other
ethical myside task.
Finally, future research could examine the role that educational level and
cognitive ability play in the resistance of myside bias in ethical contexts. There does
exist a large body of literature to suggest increases cognitive ability do not necessarily
result in decreases in myside bias (see Stanovich & West, 2008a, 2008b). However, the
extent to which the relationship between myside bias and cognitive ability persists in an
ethical decision making context is not established.
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Footnotes
1

Recent research has suggested that use of the Mturk is appropriate and in many

regards beneficial for psychological survey research. For example, it has been found by a
number of researchers that Mturk samples are generally older than university participant
pool samples (Mage = 32), more internally motivated to take the survey seriously, and are
oftentimes more attentive and diligent when completing surveys (Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011; Ipeirotis, 2010; Mason & Suri, 2012)
2

During the data collection process it was brought to the attention of the

researcher than an error was present in one of the non-myside MoAs. Specifically, the
third and final non-myside MoA concerning the allocation of surgical procedures
contained a typographical error than made the groups receiving the procedures unable to
be differentiated. Therefore, any subsequent results that reference non-myside MoAs do
not reference the erroneous item as it was dropped. Further, any categorizations of
participants based on their responses to the MoA do not reference the surgical procedure
MoA.
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Table 1.
Means and Standard Deviations from the Time by Condition Mixed ANOVA
N

M

SD

Myside MoA
Condition 1 (US80%)

153

69.29

19.27

Condition 2 (GER80%)

147

65.07

23.32

Condition 1 (US80%)

153

71.58

20.25

Condition 2 (GER80%)

147

70.75

20.18

Non-myside MoA

Table 2.
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Intercorrlations between Measures of Allocation, CRT, NFC, AOT, and Numeracy
MoA1
MoA2
MoA3
CRT
NFC
AOT
Numeracy
MoA1 (80% Group)
.647**
.566**
.161**
.064
.235**
.139*
‐‐
MoA2 (80% Group)
.749**
.158**
.011
.187**
.226**
‐‐
MoA3 (40% Group)
.092
-.021
.112
.178**
‐‐
CRT
.240**
.407**
.490**
‐‐
NFC
.413**
.497**
‐‐
AOT
.230**
‐‐
Numeracy
‐‐
Note : MoA1 = MoA: Myside - Livers; MoA2 = MoA: Non-myside - Kidneys; MoA3 = MoA: Non-myside - Heart Valves
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

MYSIDE BIAS IN ETHICAL DECISION MAKING

40

Table 3.
Results of the Hierarchical Regressions Demonstrating the Moderating Influence of
Actively Open-minded Thinking on Myside Bias
Between-subjects Myside Bias
Predictor Variables
Step 1
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Step 2
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Step 3
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Interaction

sr2

B

SEB

β

.296

.071

.235 .055

.301
2.318

.071
1.2

.300 .069
31.677 9.306
-.221 .069

R2
.055**

ΔR2

.067**

.012

.098**

.031**

.240 .057
.108 .012
.238 .057
1.481 .035
-1.384 .031

Within-subjects Myside Bias
Predictor Variables
Step 1
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Step 2
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Step 3
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Interaction
* p < .05
** p < .001

B

SEB

-.075

.059

-.079 .059
-1.750 1.009
-.078 .059
-24.359 7.844
.170 .059

β

sr2

R2
.005

ΔR2

-.073 .053
.015

.010

.043*

.027*

-.077 .059
-.100 .010
-.076 .056
-1.392 .031
1.302 .027
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Table 4.
Points of Intersection and Regions of Significance of AOT Moderation Analyses
Region of Significance
AOT Moderation Analysis
Point of Intersection
Lower Limit
Upper Limit
Between-subjects Effect
143.33
130.00
187.95
Within-subjects Effect
143.29
128.39
211.53
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Table 5.
Means and Standard Deviations from the Time by Condition Mixed ANOVAs for
Utilitarians and Absolutists
N
M
SD
Utilitarians
Myside MoA
Condition 1 (US80%)
59
73.25
18.06
Condition 2 (GER80%)
57
63.60
25.72
Non-myside MoA
Condition 1 (US80%)
Condition 2 (GER80%)

59
57

74.44
76.58

19.15
18.30

Absolutists
Myside MoA
Condition 1 (US80%)
Condition 2 (GER80%)

44
46

64.09
65.43

17.16
22.65

Non-myside MoA
Condition 1 (US80%)
Condition 2 (GER80%)

44
46

63.86
64.89

19.26
19.02
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Table 6.
Results of the Hierarchical Regressions Demonstrating the Moderating Influence of
Actively Open-minded Thinking on Myside Bias for Utilitarians
Between-subjects Myside Bias
Predictor Variables
Step 1
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Step 2
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Step 3
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Interaction

B
.384
.411
5.491

SEB
.111
.108
1.954

β

sr2

R2
.095*

ΔR2

.154**

.059*

.237**

.083*

.308 .095
.330 .108
.244 .059

.409
.103
.328 .106
53.072 13.763
2.36 .101
-.361
.103 -2.135 .083
Within-subjects Myside Bias

Predictor Variables
Step 1
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Step 2
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Step 3
Actively Open-minded Thinking
Myside Condition
Interaction
* p < .05
** p < .001

B
-.074

SEB
.111

β

sr2

R2
.004

ΔR2

-.063 .004
.084* .080**

-.104
1.93

.107
1.93

-.088 .008
-.284 .080
.179** .095**

-.101
.102 -.086 .007
-54.306 13.553 -2.544 .118
.366
.102 2.281 .094
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Table 7.
Points of Intersection and Regions of Significance of AOT Moderation Analyses for
Utilitarians
Region of Significance
AOT Moderation Analysis
Point of Intersection
Lower Limit
Upper Limit
Between-subjects Effect
147.01
134.11
190.91
Within-subjects Effect
148.38
135.66
191.22
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Figure 1.
Plotted Cell Means from the two-way ANOVA Examining Myside Bias
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Figure 2.

Number of Organ Allocated to the Myside MoA
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Figure 3.

Difference between Organs Allocated to
Non-myside and Myside MoAs

The Moderating Influence of AOT on Within-subjects Myside Bias
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Figure 4.
Plotted Cell Means from the two-way ANOVA Examining Myside Bias for Utilitarians
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Figure 5.

Number of Organ Allocated to the Myside MoA
80% Groups
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Figure 6.

Difference between Organs Allocated to
Non-myside and Myside MoAs
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Appendix A
Measure of Allocation: Myside - Livers
We are going to ask you a question about a health issue. There is no “right” or “wrong”
answer to this question.
Imagine that 100 children in the United States and 100 children in Germany have a very
rare liver disease and will die if they do not receive a liver transplant within one year.
Unfortunately, at this time no livers are available in either country for children with this
very rare liver disease. However, 100 of the needed type of livers have become
temporarily available for use in these transplants from a source outside of these two
countries.
Because different surgical procedures are used in each country, transplant patients have
survival rates of 80% (50% in condition 2) in the United States and 50% (80% in
condition 2) in Germany:
United States survival rate:

80% (50% in condition 2)

Germany survival rate:

50% (80% in condition 2)

Assuming that the 100 life-saving livers could be allocated in any way among the 100
children in the United States and the 100 children in Germany, how would you allocate
them?

United States
Germany
Total

100
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Appendix B
Measures of Allocation: Non-myside - Kidneys
We are going to ask you a question about a health issue. There is no “right” or “wrong”
answer to this question.
As you may know, there is a shortage of kidneys available for those who need
transplants. This problem is especially bad for children. Suppose that 200 children are
waiting to receive a kidney transplant. These children have no other health problems.
They need to receive these transplants within one year or they will die. In that time
period, only 100 usable kidneys will become available. Children who do not receive a
transplant will die.
A blood test is available that divides the children into two equally sized groups of 100
children each. Children with blood factor X have a transplant survival rate of 80% and
children with blood factor Y have a transplant survival rate of 50%. No other information
predicts their outcomes as reliably as the blood test.
Children with blood factor X survival rate:

80%

Children with blood factor Y survival rate:

50%

Assuming that the 100 life-saving kidneys could be allocated in any way among the 200
children, how would you allocate them?
Children with blood factor X:
Children with blood factor Y:
Total:

100
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Appendix C
Measures of Allocation: Non-myside – Heart Valves
Imagine that 800 children from two foreign countries, A and B, are suffering from a very
rare heart condition that can only be treated by the implantation of an unusual type of
heart valve. Unfortunately, only a limited number of these special artificial heart valves
are currently available. In fact, only 400 of these heart valves will be available in time to
save the children’s lives.
Imagine also that the lifesaving heart valve surgery has a survival rate of 40% in children
from Country A and 25% in children from Country B. There are 400 children who need a
heart valve in Country A and 400 children that need a heart valve in Country B .
Children in country A survival rate:

40%

Children in country B survival rate:

25%

Assuming that the 400 life-saving artificial heart valves could be allocated in any way
among the 400 children in Country A and 400 children in Country B, how would you
allocate them?
Children in Country A:
Children in Country B:
Total:

400
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Appendix D
Measures of Allocation: Non-myside – Heart Valves
Imagine that 200 children are suffering from a rare form of lung cancer and will die
within a year if they do not have their tumors removed. Unfortunately, there are few
surgeons with the very specialized skill needed to successfully operate on children with
this rare form of lung cancer. In fact, there are only enough surgeons to perform 100
surgical procedures in the year the 200 children have to live.
100 of the children have what is classified as a Type 1 tumor and 100 children have what
is classified as a Type 2 tumor. The chances of surviving the operation are dependent on
the type of tumors the children have. Type 1 tumor patients have a 30% chance of
surviving the operation and Type 2 tumor patients have a 70% chance of surviving the
operation.
Children with Type 1 tumor survival rate:

30%

Children with Type 2 tumor survival rate:

70%

Assuming that the available procedures could be allocated in any way among the 100
children with a Type 1 tumor and the 100 children with a Type 2 tumor, how many
procedures would you allocate to each group?
Children with a Type 1 tumor:
Children with a Type 2 tumor:
Total:

100

Note: This item was dropped due to a typographical error in the survey version of the
item.
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Appendix E
Measures of Allocation: Non-myside – Heart Valves Follow Up Questions
Do you think the way you allocated the surgical procedures to the children with lung
cancer would be likely to save the maximum number of children’s lives?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Yes
Probably yes
Probably no
No

If you were given the option of ignoring the survival rates for the two groups of children
(Type 1 = 30%; Type 2=70% ) and instead have the procedures randomly distributed
among the two groups, would you prefer that option?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No

Note: These items was dropped due to a typographical error in the survey version of the
MoA they referred to.
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Appendix F
Cognitive Reflection Test
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?
____5____ cents
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to build 5 widgets, how long does it take 100 machines
to build 100 widgets?

____5____ minutes
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long does it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake?
____47____ days
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Appendix G
Need For Cognition Scale
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.
3. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
4. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
5. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.
6. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
7. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
8. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of work.
9. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities.
10. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it
works.
11. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
12. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
13. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me
personally.
14. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
15. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to
think in depth about something.
16. I only think as hard as I have to.
17. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
18. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.

MYSIDE BIAS IN ETHICAL DECISION MAKING

58

Appendix H
The Marble Task
Marble Color Prediction Game:
Imagine that a bowl contains the following 9 marbles that are randomly mixed up:
3 black marbles
6 white marbles
In Round 1 of a game, a marble is randomly picked from the bowl and its color is noted.
The ball is then put back into the bowl, and the 9 marbles are once again randomly mixed
up. This process is repeated for a total of 9 rounds.
Imagine that you will win $5 each time you correctly predict the color of the randomly
selected marble.
Indicate the color that you would predict for each of the 9 rounds:
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3:
Round 4:
Round 5:
Round 6:
Round 7:
Round 8:
Round 9:

black or white
black or white
black or white
black or white
black or white
black or white
black or white
black or white
black or white

[Optimal response would be nine consecutive white marbles choices]
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Appendix I
Demographics
1. What is your age? ______
2. What is your sex?
a. Male
b. Female
3. Is English your first language?
a. Yes
b. No
4. Are you currently a college student?
a. Yes
b. No
5. What is the highest level of education you have received?
a. Less than a high school diploma
b. High school diploma or GED
c. Some college
d. B.A. degree
e. M.A. degree
f. Ph.D.
g. Professional degree (e.g., law, medicine)
h Not applicable
6. Politically, I would consider myself to be:
a. Very conservative
b. Conservative
c. Slightly conservative
d. Slightly liberal
e. Liberal
f. Very liberal
7. If the 2012 presidential election were held today, I would vote for:
a. Mitt Romney
b. Barack Obama
c. I am not eligible to vote
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Appendix J
Numeracy Scale
1. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 1 in
100, 1 in 1000, 1 in 10?
a. 1 in 100 b. 1 in 1000 c. 1 in 10
2. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 1%, 10%,
5%?
a. 1% b. 10% c. 5%
11. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to
get the disease out of 100? [10]

11. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to
get the disease out of 1000? [100]

5. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a
___% chance of getting the disease. [20%]
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is double
that of A’s, what is B’s risk? [2%]
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s risk
is double that of A, what is B’s risk? [2 in 100]
8. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? [10]
9. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many
times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? [500 times]
10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how
many of them are expected to get infected? [5]
11. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in
1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
[.1%]
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Appendix K
Ethical Dilemmas
Trolley Switch:
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the
tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks extending
to the right is a single railway workman.
If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five
workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your
dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the
single workman.

Footbridge:
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if
the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is
a stranger who happens to be very large.
The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge
and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die
if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved.

